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The Establishment Clause, Secondary
Religious Effects, and Humanistic
Education
The Supreme Court decisions proscribing prayer' and Bible reading2 in
public schools provoked considerable public debate. That debate has con-
tinued,3 fueled in part by fear that the removal of those religious practices
from public schools would hinder the moral development of school chil-
dren.4 A number of different, avowedly nonreligious, moral education pro-
grams5 that purport to encourage and channel the moral development of
the individual child have emerged in the wake of the prayer and Bible-
reading decisions.6 Although diverse in method, all of these programs, un-
like more traditional forms of moral training,7 reflect the influence of an
educational philosophy known as Humanistic Education.
The Humanistic Education movement, originally concerned primarily
with counteracting the dehumanizing character of technocratic modern ed-
ucation,' has evolved into a comprehensive social and moral philosophy'
1. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
2. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
3. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1980, § 12, at 3, col. 1 (many groups still fighting to put prayer back
in public schools; between 10% and 30% of public schools still refuse to comply with prayer decisions).
4. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1980, § 2, at 10, col. 5 (some proponents of prayer believe that
"crime, vandalism, and drugs are all results of ruling prayer from the schools"); cf D. BOLES, THE
BIBLE, RELIGION, AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 245-48 (1961) (proponents of Bible reading believe that
its absence from public schools will lead to decline in moral standards).
5. See infra notes 48 & 49. This Note discusses some of the more widespread programs, including
Values Clarification, Moral Development, sensitivity training, meditation, and fantasy guidance.
6. See Kirschenbaum, Recent Research in Values Clarification, in VALUES EDUCATION 71 (J.
Meyer, B. Burnham, & J. Chovlat eds. 1975) (" 'Values clarification approach' has gained wide-
spread popularity throughout American education."); NEWSWEEK, June 2, 1980, at 58 (more than
6000 school systems have offered values education courses, and more than 300,000 classroom teachers
have attended workshops to learn how to teach values education); N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1980, § 3, at
1, col. 1 (values education still making inroads into American public elementary and secondary
schools).
7. See HUMANISTIC EDUCATION SOURCEBOOK (D. Read & S. Simon eds. 1975) (discussing philos-
ophy of Humanistic Education) [hereinafter cited as D. READ & S. SIMON]; E. SIMPSON & M. GRAY,
HUMANISTIC EDUCATION: AN INTERPRETATION (1976) (describing various Humanistic Education
programs); R. VALETT, HUMANISTIC EDUCATION 1 (1977) (drawing distinction between traditional
education and Humanistic Education); Alschuler, Humanistic Education, in D. READ & SIMON,
supra, at 62, 66 (describing Humanistic Education and how it differs from more traditional forms of
moral training).
8. See C. PATTERSON, HUMANISTIC EDUCATION 10-18 (1973); Miller, An Education for the
Whole Person, in THE PERSON IN EDUCATION 39, 41-42 (C. Schlosser ed. 1976).
9. See, e.g., E. SIMPSON & M. GRAY, supra note 7, at 67 (Humanistic Education concerned with
any subject matter that relates people to themselves, to each other, and to external environments, and
encompasses many social and economic issues); Newmann, Social Action and Humanistic Education,
in HUMANISTIC EDUCATION 67 (R. Weller ed. 1977) (Humanistic Education calls for comprehensive
examination of social structures and systems of meaning).
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with specific implications for the design of curriculum,'" the relationship
of teacher to student," and the role of education in society.' 2 Because sys-
tematic instruction in values and morality can act to advance or inhibit
religious beliefs," the widespread introduction of Humanistic Education
programs in public schools raises important issues under the establishment
clause of the First Amendment.' This Note takes a new look at the con-
stitutional implications of government programs with secondary religious
effects, using Humanistic Education in public schools as its main exam-
ple. After examining present establishment clause doctrine in light of the
historical purposes and values embodied in the clause, the Note argues
that many forms of Humanistic Education, although not prohibited by
present doctrine, pose a substantial threat to the core values of the estab-
lishment clause. The Note concludes that even though the establishment
clause permits the state to pursue compelling governmental interests
through some programs having secondary religious effects, current forms
of Humanistic Education cannot be justified and should be eliminated.
I. The Contours of Establishment Clause Doctrine
The Supreme Court's early establishment clause decisions, drawing
heavily upon aspects of the historic struggle for religious freedom in
America, identified strict separation of church and state as the fundamen-
tal requirement of the establishment clause."5 Because a significant level of
10. See, e.g., THE PHILOSOPHY OF CURRICULUM (S. Hook, P. Kurtz, & M. Todorovich eds.
1975) (essays discussing implications of Humanistic philosophy for design of curricula for social sci-
ence, natural science, history, and general education); S. SIMON, L. HOWE, & H. KIRSCHENBAUM,
VALUES CLARIFICATION: A HANDBOOK OF PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR TEACHERS AND STUDENTS
(1972) (illustrating how to implement Values Clarification approach in public schools).
11. See, e.g., L. RATHS, M. HARMIN, & S. SIMON, VALUES AND TEACHING 77 (1st ed. 1966)
(discussing proper role of teacher in helping children form values); Rogers, The Interpersonal Rela-
tionship in the Facilitation of Learning, in HUMANIZING EDUCATION: THE PERSON IN THE PROCESS 1
(R. Leeper ed. 1967) (role of teacher is to help students teach themselves, not to transmit knowledge
or values).
12. See, e.g., L. RATHS, M. HARMIN, & S. SIMON, supra note 11, at 26 (although family plays
limited role, educators should bear main burden for helping children define priorities and discover
meaning out of confusion in modern society); Weinberg, The School, the Society, and the Individual,
in HUMANISTIC FOUNDATIONS OF EDUCATION 71 (C. Weinberg ed. 1972) (educators must help shape
moral and social outlook of children).
13. This Note deals primarily with certain explicit attempts by government to manipulate the
moral orientation of children. Some commentators have argued, however, that public schools inevita-
bly transmit and inculcate certain value judgments and are therefore constitutionally problematic
whatever their official policies. See Arons & Lawrence, The Manipulation of Consciousness: A First
Amendment Critique of Schooling, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 309, 316-17 (1980). The balancing
test proposed in this Note finds a middle ground between this extreme position and the deference
shown in present doctrine. See infra p. 1223.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion. .... )
15. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (establishment clause erects "high
and impregnable wall" between church and state); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211-
12 (1948) (reiterating Everson standard).
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contacts between church and state inhere in the structure of modern soci-
ety, the application of the separation standard consistently proved prob-
lematic, and the Court eventually shifted to a set of more specific stan-
dards. Doctrinal missteps in the course of the Court's transition, however,
have obscured the role of two closely related underlying purposes of the
establishment clause: preserving freedom of religious choice, and main-
taining the state's neutrality in private religious activities.
A. The Legacy of the Separation-of-Church-and-State Standard
The separation standard, as the Court originally formulated it, forbade
almost all forms of government involvement with religion. The Court con-
ceived the notion of religious "effect" as one way of expressing the ab-
sence of the required separation: contacts between church and state were
deemed to have an unconstitutional religious effect.'6
Because the early cases involved problems similar to those familiar to
the framers of the First Amendment," the Court's initial reliance on the
historical background of the establishment clause was understandable.
The framers of the First Amendment undoubtedly viewed separation of
church and state as a way of enforcing establishment clause values in the
context of the extremely limited government with which they were famil-
iar. The scale and diversity of government activities that characterize to-
day's welfare state, however, have made contacts between church and state
inevitable. Although that growth has not made the goals that the framers
16. Although the "effect" test was first formally announced as the constitutional standard in Ab-
ington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963), earlier cases had informally applied it. See
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442-43 (1961) (noting that non-secular purpose and effect
render enactment unconstitutional under establishment clause); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
1, 16-17 (1947) (discussing purpose and result of enactment at issue). The role of "effect" in formula-
tions of the separation standard carried over, however, to confuse the application of the effect test
when it became the official instrument of the Court's establishment clause inquiry. Thus, the Court
noted as recently as Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 242-43 (1968), that "the constitutional
standard is the separation of Church and State," but the test is "the purpose and primary effect of the
enactment."
17. Opposition to the colonial practice of exacting public financial support for the politically dom-
inant religion moved James Madison, one of the principal thinkers behind the establishment clause, to
write his Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessment, quoted in Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 719 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting), and provoked Thomas Jefferson to join
with him to press for and win an establishment prohibition in Virginia. See Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1947) (discussing history of Virginia Bill of Rights).
In light of this history, Everson, which involved a challenge to government payment of bus fares of
children attending parochial schools, and McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), which
involved a challenge to a released time program for religious instruction in public schools, both seemed
to pose paradigmatic establishment clause issues. The Court responded in both cases by declaring that
the establishment clause could not tolerate anything less than absolute separation of church and state,
though it ultimately upheld the Everson statute. In later cases, the Court stressed that the lesson to be
learned from history was that the union of church and state tends to degrade religion and provoke
disrespect for governmental authority by focusing political division along religious lines. See, e.g.,
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
1198
Establishment Clause
sought to embody in the First Amendment less important, it has left
anachronistic and incomplete any system for applying the establishment
clause that is centered on the specific approaches the Court associated
with the framers."8
Indeed, the Court itself has long been troubled by a tension between
keeping religion separate from government and excluding religion from
the benefits of facially nonreligious governmental activity. There was no
question, for example, that the state could provide fire and police protec-
tion to religious institutions. 9 Similarly, though perhaps less clearly, pro-
viding free transportation to students in parochial as well as public schools
seemed to be a legitimate governmental measure to secure the public wel-
fare and safety.20 Yet by permitting such forms of aid to religion, the
Court severely tested its strict-separation approach and exposed serious
logical breaches in establishment clause doctrine. 21
18. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 834 (1978) (movement from government of
closely limited powers to affirmative state requires reevaluation of religion clauses; in affirmative state,
religious tolerance may become "positive commitment that encourages the flourishing of conscience"
rather than simply "negative principle"); Gianella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, And Doctri-
nal Development (pt. 2), 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 514-15 (1968) (because government is involved more
extensively in structuring social order, treatment of religious groups has become fundamentally differ-
ent question from that confronting framers of establishment clause); cf. Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 235 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("too literal quest for the advice of the
Founding Fathers upon [establishment clause] issues" is "misdirected").
19. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947).
20. Id.
21. In the context of an extremely limited government, the principle of separation of church and
state is workable and serves to protect religious freedom. As government grows in size and diversity of
function, however, it inevitably assumes responsibilities that affect the welfare of religious groups. If,
in this context, separation is interpreted to mean that government cannot institute measures to mini-
mize or offset the deleterious impact of its programs on religious groups, the result is to inhibit relig-
ion. Professor Gianella uses the example of a hypothetical collectivist state that controls all resources
to illustrate the tendency of the separation approach to inhibit religion as government expands. Be-
cause religious groups would be dependent upon the state merely to exist, the collectivist government
would at a minimum have to provide them with property in order to avoid inhibiting religion. See
Gianella, supra note 18, at 522-23. The separation standard would prohibit such salutary action. In
fact, however, such action would actually contribute to, rather than detract from, the protection of
establishment clause values by counterbalancing the inhibiting effect of governmental ownership of
resources. The example of the hypothetical collectivist state shows that the correlation between separa-
tion of church and state and the protection of establishment clause values tends to decrease as the level
of government influence over the social order increases.
Contemporary government does not, of course, exercise the dominance of the collectivist state, and
the sort of restorative measures that would contribute to neutrality in the collectivist state would serve
demonstrably to advance religion if effected by contemporary government. Nevertheless, contemporary
government does exert influence over resources and activities whose control is of central concern to
religious groups, making applicable the principle, though not the specific prescription, deducible from
the collectivist state. Government regulation of radio and television air waves, for example, carries
with it the responsibility to accommodate religious broadcasting. The elimination of religious pro-
gramming would severely inhibit religion. Government regulations designed to ensure the survival of
religious programming offset the inhibiting effect of government control of the air waves, and thus
actually protect establishment clause values, even though such regulations offend the concept of sepa-
ration of church and state. Similarly, government control over a public forum carries the obligation, if
that forum is or must be opened to expression, to accommodate religious expression. Widmar v. Vin-
cent, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981).
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During the next twenty years, the Supreme Court developed an ap-
proach for testing the permissibility of governmental activities that re-
quires it to assume, contrary to a rule of strict separation, that some gov-
ernment involvement with religion is consistent with the establishment
clause.2 The Court currently applies a three-pronged test in establish-
ment clause cases: if a challenged government program involves a non-
secular purpose, 3 has a primary effect that advances or inhibits religion,"
or fosters an excessive entanglement between government and religion, 5
the pr6gram is inpermissible. Unfortunately, the Court explained its move
to the three-pronged test26 as an erosion of the separation standard," not
22. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) (some involvement between government
and religion is inevitable); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669-70 (1970) (establishment clause
does not require rigid separation, but "benevolent neutrality" that permits religious exercise to exist
without sponsorship or interference). The Court could have dealt with the pressure to limit the reach
of the establishment clause by narrowing the definition of religion under the establishment clause. See
infra note 40.
23. The Court has expressly relied solely on an analysis of purpose in only two establishment
clause cases in this century. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980), reh'g denied, 449 U.S. 1104
(1981) (finding unconstitutional religious purpose in posting Ten Commandments on walls of public
school classrooms); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103 (1968) (striking down law prohibiting
teaching of evolution in public schools for having unconstitutional religious purpose). The Court typi-
cally defers to the State's proffered secular purpose, focusing instead on the effect of the program. See,
e.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977) (usual problem is "effect" and "entanglement"
analysis, not scrutiny of "purpose"); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
The Court indirectly considered purpose in several cases when it analyzed the facial neutrality of
legislative classification schemes. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970) (uphold-
ing constitutionality of tax exemption extended to religious, charitable, and nonprofit institutions);
Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248-49 (1968) (upholding constitutionality of programs that
lent secular textbooks to children in both private and public schools). Obviously, a narrow classifica-
tion scheme that primarily benefits religious groups would suggest that the challenged legislation had
a non-secular purpose. Cf Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794 (1973)
(breadth of classification scheme relevant to political divisiveness test).
24. See infra note 28, & p. 1204.
25. The entanglement prong of present doctrine has two distinct parts. One part of the entangle-
ment test prohibits government activity that focuses political opinion along religious lines. See Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975) (establishment clause forbids government action that "creates a
serious potential for divisive conflict over the issue of aid to religion-'entanglement in the broader
sense of continuing political strife' "). The other part of the entanglement test is more specific, forbid-
ding government action that places government in a monitoring capacity that requires close and con-
tinuous contact with a religious institution. Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
795-97 (1973) (establishment clause forbids entanglement of government with religion in sense of "a
comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance").
The adoption of the excessive entanglement test as a separate prong of establishment clause analysis
in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971), actually limited, rather than expanded, the role
of the political neutrality value. The excessive entanglement prong, unlike the separation standard,
has in practice largely limited concern for political neutrality to the context of institutional contact
with religion. Compare Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1947) (discussing unconstitu-
tionality of government action that creates entanglement in broader sense of continuing political strife
over religious issues) with Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 244 (1977) (discussing only danger of
administrative entanglement). Cf Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 373-79 (1975) (Brennan, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that Court has not given enough weight to broader
aspect of entanglement posed by divisive political potential of programs).
26. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
27. Id. at 614 ("[Tlhe line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indistinct, and
variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship.")
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as a refinement, leaving the impression that it was reducing its commit-
ment to underlying establishment clause values. Because the meaning of
"religious effect" was bound up with the separation standard, the erosion
of the standard led to the conclusion, now embodied in the three-prong
test, that a prohibition of government programs with secondary effects ad-
vancing or inhibiting religion was, like complete separation, impractical. 8
B. The Fundamental Purposes of the Establishment Clause
The Court's abandonment of the strict separation standard was appro-
priate, not because rigorous enforcement of establishment clause values is
somehow impractical, but because the separation standard is a poor proxy
for the clause's underlying values. The erosion of the separation standard
should therefore be construed not as a devaluation of the establishment
clause, but as an attempt by the Court to serve the clause's central pur-
poses: the preservation of freedom of private religious choice and the
maintenance of political neutrality.
The establishment clause, as the Supreme Court has long recognized, is
intended to protect freedom of private religious choice.29 Its operation in
prohibiting some governmental activities depends, not on any showing of
actual government coercion of individual choice,"0 but only on inducement
28. A prohibition of secondary religious effects does indeed appear impractical if the term effect is
understood to refer to separation of church and state. Enforcing separation of church and state does
not, however, always further constitutional ideals. The term religious effect is thus better applied to
express the diminution in protection of establishment clause ideals that occurs when religion is ad-
vanced or inhibited. Used in this technical sense, the term religious effect would not apply to govern-
ment action designed to mitigate the inhibiting effect of the dominance of governmental authority over
activities directly affecting the welfare of religious groups. Such action contributes to the protection of
establishment clause values by minimizing the adverse effect on religious groups of increased govern-
mental intervention in the social order. Cf Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952) ("[W]hen
the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities . . . it follows the
best of our traditions."); Gianella, supra note 18, at 515 (private choice will be frustrated if govern-
ment does not take religion into account in its allocation decisions). Similarly, the term religious effect
would not encompass the effect of government action required by the free exercise clause. See infra
note 30.
By contrast, associating the term religious effect with separation of church and state results in the
identification of the effect of innocuous government accommodation of religious interests as a religious
effect and thereby creates an artificial pressure to shorten the reach of the effect test, as the Court has
done by limiting the current test to "primary" effects. In essence, the Court has compensated for the
lack of fit between underlying establishment clause values and its use of the term religious effect by
extending blanket approval to secondary religious effects and artificially limiting the establishment
clause prohibition to primary religious effects. This compromise, however, protects not only innocuous
government action but also government action injurious to establishment clause values. Conforming
the definition of religious effect to underlying establishment clause values eliminates the artificial pres-
sure to truncate the reach of the effect test, and makes rigorous enforcement of establishment clause
values feasible.
29. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429-30 (1962); Gianella, supra note 18, at 517.
30. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962). By contrast, the free exercise clause protects
against coercion of choice. Id. Because coercion is an individual harm, government action that in-
fringes free exercise clause values sometimes may be remedied by exempting the complaining individ-
ual from the program. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (partially exempting Old
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of choice. 1 Moreover, since it is a government program's tendency to in-
duce some choice, not actually to coerce it, that violates the establishment
clause, the Court cannot preserve a challenged program from establish-
ment-clause condemnation merely by exempting particular individuals
from its reach.32 Government activity may induce private religious choice
either by inhibiting or encouraging a particular religious choice. Advance-
ment of religion occurs when government activity gives official sanction or
support to the beliefs of a particular religion.3 Such activity may also
have the effect of inhibiting belief in religions whose tenets conflict with
the official view. Inhibition of private choice may also occur when, by its
hostility to certain beliefs, government action makes a particular religious
choice look less appealing.34
Closely related to the guarantee of religious voluntarism is the estab-
lishment clause's requirement that government avoid activity that tends to
create significant political divisions over religious issues.3" Such activities
Order Amish from compulsory education law); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (exempting
Seventh-Day Adventist from unemployment benefit regulation requiring that she be available to work
on Saturdays). By alleviating government-imposed burdens on religion, exemptions required by the
free exercise clause merely restore government to a neutral position and thus do not run afoul of the
establishment clause. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1972) (protecting values pro-
moted by right of free exercise not necessarily inconsistent with establishment clause); Merel, The
Protection of Individual Choice: A Consistent Understanding of the First Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L.
REV. 805, 823 (1978) (protection of particular religious exercise required by free exercise clause does
not violate establishment clause values so long as similar exemptions not denied to other religious
groups). Accommodation of free exercise interests can extend beyond the level of accommodation re-
quired by the free exercise clause. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970) ("The limits
of permissible state accommodation to religion are by no means co-extensive with the noninterference
mandated by the Free Exercise Clause."); L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 822 (actions even arguably
compelled by free exercise clause should be permissible under establishment clause).
31. See Note, Toward a Uniform Valuation of the Religion Guarantees, 80 YALE L. J. 77, 85
(1970).
32. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1963) (exemption not a defense to
claim of unconstitutionality under establishment clause); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962)
(exempting students from having to recite prayer in public schools is unresponsive to constitutional
problems of public school prayers).
33. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (establishment clause prohibits
official government support for tenets of religion); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430-31 (1962) (es-
tablishment clause prevents government from placing its power and prestige behind religion).
34. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (affirmative opposition or
hostility to religion violates establishment clause); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)
(government action that inhibits religion by preventing particular religious choice violates establish-
ment clause).
35. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975) (political division along religious lines was
one of principal evils establishment clause was intended to protect against); Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-12 (1947) (reviewing dangers of political division along religious lines); L.
TRIBE, supra note 18, at 819 (establishment clause concerned with preventing sectarian differences
from dividing body politic); Gianella, supra note 18, at 517 (establishment clause guards political
neutrality as well as voluntarism).
Some commentators argue that the establishment clause, like the free exercise clause, can be re-
duced to a guarantee of freedom of private choice. See, e.g., Merel, supra note 30; Note, supra note
31, at 98 n.102 (establishment clause consults no value other than private choice; political neutrality
value is dependent on private choice value); Schwarz, No Imposition of Religion: The Establishment
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undermine the normal functioning of the political process. 3 6 Indeed, it is
an historical commonplace that political polarization along religious lines
can threaten the viability of a political system."
C. Functional Aspects of Present Doctrine
To achieve consistency and predictability of application, a constitutional
system must have not only ideals, but some sort of principled structure
capable of expressing the relationship between the ideals and the conflicts
that impelled creation of the system. The strain of reducing constitutional
ideals to an existential form inevitably forces revision of the structure and
some adaptation of the ideals. The compromise reached by present doc-
trine takes the form of two functional limitations on the scope of the es-
tablishment clause.
The definition of religion plays a significant exclusionary role in cur-
rent doctrine. 8 Methodologically, the definition of religion could enter es-
tablishment clause analysis as a threshold issue or as -a factor in the evalu-
ation of the actual criteria of constitutionality. Treating the definition of
religion as a threshold issue requires dividing the universe of beliefs ad-
vanced or inhibited by challenged governmental programs into two
groups: religious and nonreligious. Programs advancing beliefs deemed to
be religious pass the threshold and are then subjected to the actual criteria
of constitutionality to determine, for example, whether they have a pri-
mary or secondary religious effect. Obversely, defining a system of belief
as nonreligious automatically places the issue of its advancement beyond
Clause Value, 77 YALE L.J. 692, 710-12 (1968) (political strife criterion normally will argue both in
favor of and against particular program, and, therefore, is not helpful guide). Some commentators also
argue that the authors of the First Amendment intended only to protect religious choice, not to prevent
political divisiveness over religious issues. See M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 19
(1965). But see Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1680, 1692 (1969)
(framers of First Amendment considered political neutrality to be independent constitutional concern);
Note, Government Neutrality And Separation Of Church And State: Tuition Tax Credits, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 696, 699 (1979) (danger from political divisiveness exists apart from effect on private choice).
The current Supreme Court test embodies political neutrality as an independent concern, not
merely as a derivative of the private choice value. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 372 (1975);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The old separation standard also placed consider-
able emphasis on political neutrality as an independent value. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,
430-35 (1962).
36. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971) ("Ordinarily political debate and division,
however vigorous or even partisan, are normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of
government, but political division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the
First Amendment was intended to protect. .... The potential divisiveness of such conflict is a threat
to the normal political process.")
37. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (government activ-
ity that encourages competition among religious sects for political supremacy can lead "to strife and
frequently strain a political system to the breaking point").
38. See infra note 40.
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the scope of the establishment clause. 9
On the other hand, the definition of religion could be employed as a
factor in evaluating the substantiality of a program's religious effect.
Under this approach, the definition of religion would be used to assess the
degree to which a system of beliefs advanced by challenged governmental
action was religious. In turn, the degree to which a program was religious
would be considered along with other factors, such as the directness with
which the beliefs were advanced or inhibited, in determining whether a
challenged program met the actual criteria of constitutionality. The lack
of a clear constitutional basis for finally determining a definition of relig-
ion suggests that the dichotomous definition of religion required by a
threshold analysis would be arbitrary. Nevertheless, current doctrine
treats the definition of religion as a threshold issue, and thus implicity
excludes from the scope of the establishment clause all systems of belief
not deemed to be sufficiently religious.40
The limitation of the effect test in present doctrine to "primary" reli-
gious effects 4' also performs an exclusionary function. Despite its signifi-
cance as an exclusionary device, the distinction between primary and sec-
ondary effects is obscure. The distinction implicitly recognizes that most
governmental programs whose constitutionality is questioned under the es-
tablishment clause will have both secular and religious components. Ana-
lyzing the way in which the secular and religious components of a pro-
gram combine may thus shed light on the nature of the effect produced. 2
II. Humanistic Education and Establishment Clause Values
The phenomenon of Humanistic Education in the public schools high-
lights the problem of identifying the proper scope of the establishment
clause. Humanistic Education affects underlying establishment clause val-
ues, but does not fall plainly within the boundaries of the Supreme
39. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 828-29 (if Transcendental Meditation were considered
nonreligious, its direct advancement in public schools would be constitutional).
40. The scope of the establishment clause can be manipulated by changing the definition of relig-
ion. A very broad definition of religion could significantly expand the scope of the establishment
clause, thereby raising the same problems that the Court attempted to avoid in redesigning the actual
criteria of unconstitutionality. See supra note 28. For example, this assumption is implicit in Professor
Tribe's assertion that a broad definition of religion under the establishment clause would prove un-
workable. See L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 827-28 (in age of affirmative state, less expansive notion of
religion required for establishment clause purposes lest all "humane" government programs be
deemed unconstitutional). Although the Court has not explicitly fashioned a definition of religion for
establishment clause purposes, some commentators believe that the Court is moving toward a rela-
tively narrow definition in order to avoid the problems suggested by Professor Tribe. See L. TRIBE,
supra note 18, at 829 (Court employs narrower definition of religion for establishment clause pur-
poses than for free exercise purposes); Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1056, 1085-86 (1978) (arguing for express adoption of such bifurcated definition).
41. See infra note 82.
42. See infra pp. 1212-16.
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Court's three-prong test.
A. The Goals and Methods of Humanistic Education
The general term, "Humanistic Education," applies to a variety of new
educational programs that have largely eclipsed more traditional forms of
formal moral discourse in public schools. 3 Humanistic Education pro-
grams are endorsed by many leading educators" and receive financial sup-
port from the federal government and leading private foundations." Edu-
cators favor Humanistic Education because it promises to meet the need
in public school for moral instruction in a way that avoids the political
and legal barriers to other forms of moral education." Instead of present-
ing children with a set of predetermined values, 47 Humanistic Education
attempts, by means of a controlled instructional environment, to teach
children how to use its methodology to resolve the moral problems they
will face in their lives.
Although all Humanistic Education programs deal with the social, psy-
chological, and moral development of children, some emphasize cognitive
development in these areas,48 while others emphasize affective or emo-
43. See E. SIMPSON & M. GRAY, supra note 7, at viii, 8, 17, 59. In a small number of Humanis-
tic Education programs, moral instruction suffuses every subject in the curriculum. See N.Y. Times,
Mar. 4, 1980, § 3, at 1, col. 1 (trend is to attempt to apply moral education to every subject). These
programs assume that, if moral instruction is to be meaningful and effective, it cannot be isolated and
presented in an abstract sense, but must be related to each aspect of a student's life and thinking.
More commonly, moral instruction is relegated to a discrete portion of the curriculum, in which
specific programs play a major role.
44. See E. SIMPSON & M. GRAY, supra note 7, at 16-17.
45. See Id. at 59 (primary support for Humanistic Education has come from small number of
influential individuals and private foundations); N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1980, § 3, at 1, col. 1 (values of
education movement became widespread when private groups and governmental agencies began to
provide funding). Various state Humanistic Education Centers receive federal funding pursuant to 20
U.S.C. § 11 19a (1976). See EDUCATION UPDATE, Fall 1979, at 2, col. 1.
46. See MORAL EDUCATION 3, 7-8 (D. Purpel & K. Ryan eds. 1976) (discussing increasing de-
mand on schools to inculcate morality); L. RATHS, M. HARMIN, & S. SIMON, supra note 11, at 20
(schools searching for non-controversial way to teach morality).
47. The belief that absolutist positions are particularly controversial is in part responsible for
Humanistic Education's assumption that presenting children with a set of predetermined values will,
at best, be of little help and may even hinder children in their development. See L. RATHS, M.
HARMIN, & S. SIMON, supra note 11, at 44-45.
48. Values Clarification is one of the more widespread and influential of this type of Humanistic
Education programs. See E. SIMPSON & M. GRAY, supra note 7, at 8, 10-11. Values Clarification
focuses on the process rather than substance of valuing; it assumes that no particular set of values is
correct, in the abstract, for a given individual. See L. RATHS, M. HARMIN, & S. SIMON, supra note
11, at 28 ("Because life is different through time and space, we cannot be certain what experiences
any one person will have. We therefore cannot be certain what values, what style of life, would be
most suitable for any person.")
Values Education theorists define three processes that are essential to real valuing. First, persons
must choose values after consideration of the consequences of alternative value choices and free of
external inducement toward a particular choice. Second, they must prize and publicly affirm the cho-
sen values. Third, they must act consistently upon those values. See id. at 28-30; S. SIMON, L. HOWE,
& H. KIR.SCHENBAUM, supra note 10, at 19 (setting forth practical strategies for classroom applica-
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tional development .4 9 The goals of the programs are accomplished through
specific exercises."0 Typically, a teacher confronts students with a ques-
tion, experience, or moral dilemma,"t and asks them to make a judgment
in favor of some value, to state an opinion, or to express a feeling.12 The
teacher then leads individual students in a programmed dialogues3
tion); S. SIMON & J. CLARK, MORE VALUES CLARIFICATION (1975) (examining use of Values Clarifi-
cation in lives of teachers and how to apply it in groups).
Lawrence Kohlberg has developed a related, but distinct, program called Moral Development.
Moral Development posits that exposure to moral conflict causes individuals to move upward through
three levels, which include six invariantly sequenced stages, of moral development. The first stage is
Preconventional Moral Reasoning, in which physical consequences define "goodness" and reciprocity
guides moral behavior. The second stage is Conventional Moral Reasoning, in which societal approval
is equated with goodness. The third stage is Postconventional Reasoning, in which morality is based
on social contract, but the individual's conscience operates independently of the system. See Kohlberg,
A Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Moral Education, in READINGS IN MORAL EDUCATION 36
(P. Scharf ed. 1978) [book hereinafter cites as P. SCHARF].
49. Various programs, broadly denominated sensitivity training, focus on facilitating the emo-
tional growth of the individual. See Black, Encounter Groups ' . .May Loom as a Potential Source
of Salvation," in D. READ & S. SIMON, supra note 7 at 188; Davis, Helfert, & Shapiro, Let's Be an
Ice Cream Machine! Creative Dramatics, in D. READ & S. SIMON, supra note 7, at 439; Krafft &
Howe, Guidelines for Sensitivity Training in Your School, in D. READ & S. SIMON, supra note 7, at
321. Sensitivity training programs use role playing, discussion, and other forms of social interaction to
help the individual become sensitive to the needs of others. In the process, the individual is meant to
develop a heightened sense of self-awareness and self-acceptance. Typically, the programs confront
students with a person or simulated experience and then encourage them to verbalize their feelings
concerning the confrontation. See, e.g., E. SIMPSON & M. GRAY, supra note 7, at 88-91 (describing
widely used technique known as The Trumpet March).
Another program under the rubric of sensitivity training is fantasy guidance. Students are asked to
fantasize about a variety of topics, including taking a trip to the moon in a spaceship, engaging in a
sexual experience, and being an ice cube. See, e.g., R. JONES, FANTASY AND FEELING IN EDUCATION
(1968); E. SIMPSON & M. GRAY, supra note 7, at 82; id. at 88. In one Humanistic approach to sex
education for students in junior high and high school, "students are asked to lie on their backs in a
circle, with arms interlocked, and share their sexual fantasies one at a time within the confines of a
dark room. It is a threatening situation for some, but they generally get into the sharing mood quick-
ly." Read, Developing Sexual Awareness: A Humanistic Approach, in D. READ & S. SIMON, supra
note 7, at 417.
50. See, e.g., S. SIMON, L. HOWE, & H. KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 10; E. SIMPSON & M. GRAY,
supra note 7, at 77-91.
51. In Values Clarification questionnaires, questions dealing with moral issues are interspersed
with questions that are not even arguably moral in nature. See, e.g., S. SIMON, L. HOWE, & H.
KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 10, at 41, 50, 51, 52, 53 ("How many of you. . . would encourage legal
abortion for an unwed daughter . . . read Playboy magazine . . . would be upset if organized relig-
ion disappeared. . . watch your weight. . . think that parents should teach their children to mastur-
bate. . . watch the Super Bowl every year"). Some commentators have argued that Values Clarifica-
tion confuses moral and non-moral issues. See Graham, Moral Education: A Child's Right to a Just
Community, 6 ELEMENTARY SCHOOL GUIDANCE AND COUNSELING 300 (1975). Moral Development is
one of the few programs that considers only moral issues. See R. HERSCH, J. MILLER, & G. FIELD-
ING, MODELS OF MORAL EDUCATION 119 (1980); Kohlberg, supra note 48, at 43.
52. See S. SIMON, L. HOWE, & H. KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 10 (discussing specific exercises for
Values Clarification); E. SIMPSON & M. GRAY, supra note 7, at 77-91; Beyer, Conducting Moral
Discussions in the Classroom, in P. SCHARF, supra note 48, at 62-75.
53. See, e.g., E. SIMPSON & M. GRAY, supra note 7, at 88-91. Humanistic Education is essen-
tially heuristic, relying upon self-reflection as the source of moral development. Id. at 7-9; see P.
VITZ, PSYCHOLOGY AS RELIGION 79-82 (1977) (discussing religious dimensions of self-reflection
methodology). This approach is based on the belief that people are innately good and that they will, if
prodded, develop in a positive direction. See Kohlberg, The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest
Stage of Moral Development, 70 J. PHIL. 630 (1973); Lee, Christian Religious Education and Moral
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designed to help them understand the ramifications or intellectual suffi-
ciency of their responses." ' Humanistic Education theorists assume that
this process will stimulate moral and personal growth."
B. The Impact of Humanistic Education on Religious Freedom
Various forms of Humanistic Education conflict sharply with certain
religious faiths."' Humanistic Education programs generally assume that
the "whole" person consists of the mind, emotions, personality, and
body, 7 that the emotions and personality can be developed through a pro-
cess of internal clarification facilitated by classroom procedures such as
responding to and discussing questionnaires," meditating,59 and discussing
fantasies;"° that there are few, if any,6 inherently right and wrong val-
Development, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT, MORAL EDUCATION, AND KOHLBERG (B. Munsey ed. 1980)
(tenet that each person is basically good and has fundamental orientation toward higher levels of
moral development is center of Kohlberg's approach) [hereinafter cites as B. MUNSEY].
54. Cognitive approaches test the sufficiency of the student's position or opinion in light of certain
principles. Values Clarification examines, among other things, whether the student freely developed
the response, whether he or she has considered the consequences of following the response through
other situations, and whether he or she is proud of the response. See, e.g., E. SIMPSON & M. GRAY,
supra note 7, at 88-91. Numerous models for implementing the Moral Development approach have
been suggested, see, e.g., Beyer, supra note 52, at 69 (applying five types of "probe" questions to ten
major issues relevant to most moral dilemmas), but each model emphasizes a "content-free" dialectic
designed to stimulate the reasoning of the individual child. See Rosenzweig, Kohlberg in the Class-
room: Moral Education Models, in B. MUNSEY, supra note 53, at 359-60. The dialectic in affective
approaches is designed to help the student verbalize more fully his or her feelings and to make the
student feel comfortable with those feelings. See E. SIMPSON & M. GRAY, supra note 7, at 88-91.
55. See, e.g., E. SIMPSON & M. GRAY, supra note 7, at 9 (Moral Development rests on premise
that exposure to moral conflict will cause individual to move upward through moral stages). Some
educators criticize this premise. See Lockwood, A Critical View of Values Clarification, in D. PURPEL
& K. RYAN, supra note 46, at 164-65 (advocates of Values Clarification do not answer such "funda-
mental questions as: assuming Adolph Hitler, Charles Manson, Martin Luther King, and Albert
Schweitzer held values which met the seven criteria, are their values equally valid, praiseworthy, and/
or good?").
56. This conflict has been discussed by several authors. See, e.g., T. LAHAYE, BATTLE FOR THE
MIND (1980) (Humanistic Education fundamentally at odds with Biblical Christianity); 0. MC-
GRAW, SECULAR HUMANISM AND THE SCHOOLS: THE ISSUE WHOSE TIME HAS COME (1976) (Hu-
manistic Education embodies religious beliefs hostile to traditional religions).
57. The focus on the "whole" person is central to Humanistic Education. See C. SCHLOSSER,
supra note 8, at 10-12; E. SIMPSON & M. GRAY, supra note 7, at 64-65; Mosher, Education In
Human Development in R. WELLER, supra note 9, at 172. Most Humanistic Educators distinguish
between education that merely develops the intellect and education that integrates intellectual with
emotional and physical development, often termed "confluent" education. See, e.g., Brown, What is
"Confluent Education"? in D. READ & S. SIMON, supra note 7, at 50.
In attempting to deal with the whole person, Humanistic Education inevitably collides with estab-
lishment clause values. If Humanistic Education actually deals with the spiritual or religious aspect of
the "whole" person, it unconstitutionally intrudes into religious areas. See infra note 77. On the other
hand, if Humanistic Education denies that there is a spiritual or religious aspect of the individual, it
proclaims a view that is hostile to religion. See infra note 65.
58. See, e.g., S. SIMON, L. HOWE, & H. KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 10, at 13-22.
59. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 7, at 63.
60. See, e.g., R. JONES, supra note 49. Sensitivity training, role playing, and psycho-drama focus
on the expression of feeling as a therapeutic device. See supra note 49. The tone of these programs'
assumptions about the nature of man and morality are distinctly religious. See P. VITZ, supra note 53,
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ues,62 and that man is innately good.63 In contrast, several major religious
faiths" teach that man has a spirit in addition to personality and emo-
tions, or is primarily a spiritual being; 5 that clarification of values should
be guided by an external standard;6 that there are right and wrong values
at 28-33, 79-82.
61. Some values educators have recently conceded that a normative approach to certain values
such as stealing and murder may be appropriate. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1980, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
62. See, e.g., Harmin & Simon, Values, in D. AI.IEN & E. SElIFNIN, Till. T.A(:III'ER'S HAND.
BOOK 294 (1971) (values are "relative, personal, and situational"); S. SIMON, L. Howl., & H.
KiRsCllENI\UN, supra note 10, at 15-17 (discussing why "moralizing" or "direct inculcation" is defi-
cient as means of moral education). Most Humanistic Education programs reject absolute values and
the idea that human purposes and goals could be determined by God or any other external standard.
See E. SINI'SON & M. GRAY, supra note 7, at 3 ("Actively antihumanistic education occurs when
teachers believe that human purposes and goals are determined from without, from external authori-
ties, whether groups, individuals, or personalized all-powerful forces, rather than from within the
individual.")
Kohlberg's Moral Development theory does, however, posit the existence of such principles as jus-
tice and equality, and makes normative judgments about the structure of moral reasoning, as evinced
by his six-tier ranking of different structures of such reasoning. Yet Kohlberg's approach rejects the
validity of extrinsic, transcendent, or independent moral values; in Kohlberg's theory, morality is a
purely rational and therefore internal and dependent construct. See, e.g., Kohlberg, Stages of Moral
Development as a Basis for Moral Education, in MORAL Ei)(:AT'ION (C. Beck ed. 1971) (form of
moral judgment is universal, but content is relative); cf. Chazan, Jewish Education and Moral Devel-
opment, in B. MUINSEY, supra note 53, at 298, 315-16 (in ignoring need for substantive moral values,
Kohlberg's approach conflicts with modern as well as classical Jewish education, which argue for
specific moral system derived from revealed truth). The theory thus retreats to a relativistic posture
when it is confronted with moral questions whose resolution from a purely rational perspective is
problematic, even assuming a priori acceptance of principles such as justice and equality.
63. Man's innate dignity, goodness, and worth is a unifying principle of Humanistic Education.
See, e.g., E. SIMPSON & M. GRAY, supra note 7, at 4 (antihumanistic education occurs when man is
perceived as instinctively evil or prone to evil). The belief in the innate goodness of man, in turn, is
used to justify the assumption that exposure to moral conflict will propel the individual in a positive
direction and that expression of self, whether through sensitivity training, encounter groups, or fan-
tasy guidance, will promote moral and emotional growth.
64. In order to assess the positions of religious groups on the issues discussed in this Note, the
notewriter contacted 41 major religious organizations. Interviews were conducted by telephone with
leaders or spokespersons for 38 of these groups. Each group was also sent a questionnaire in order to
give it an opportunity to confirm and clarify its position in writing. The groups were also asked to
provide any pertinent doctrinal statements they had published. Notes 65-68 infra contain representa-
tive citations to interviews, letters, and statements, as well as general conclusions, of the investigation.
A full report of the survey, including doctrinal statements submitted, letters or responses to the ques-
tionnaires, and summaries of the telephone interviews, is on file with the Yale Law Journal.
65. See, e.g., Letter from General Secretary, General Council of the Assemblies of God (Jan.
1981) (man's spiritual nature is most important aspect of his being); Letter from Chuck Smith, Pas-
tor, Calvary Chapel (March 1981) (man's spirit allows him to communicate with God, and "puts him
a whole dimension above the animals," but until he is "born of the Spirit," John 3:6, 7, he cannot
understand spiritual things, I Corinthians 2:14); Interview with Keith Mitchell, Director of Int'l
Missions of Church of Christ (Mar. 1981) (man has a spirit, although it cannot be neatly distin-
guished from rest of his being).
66. Many religious groups believe that moral decisions should be made by reference to sources of
revealed truth such as the Bible. See Letter from Dr. Charles Wright, Dean of the Apostolic Faith
Bible Institute, The Church of the Lord Jesus Christ of the Apostolic Faith (Mar. 23, 1981) (Bible,
revealed by Holy Spirit, is source of all moral truth); Interview with Charles Dunahoo, Coordinator
Christian Education, Presbyterian Church in America (Mar. 1981) (Bible is explicit on most moral
questions); Letter from Dr. J.A.O. Preus, President, The Lutheran Church Missouri Synod (Mar.
1981) ("moral principles are set forth in the Scriptures, the Word of God"; answers to moral dilem-
mas should "be based on Scripture and not merely on the situation or some relative or contextual
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that are transcendental and absolute rather than situational and relative,67
and that man is by nature sinful.6
At the same time, the premises of Humanistic Education coincide with
the beliefs of the nontheistic philosophical movement usually called Secu-
lar Humanism.69 In its most common forms, Secular Humanism assumes
the irrelevance of supernatural phenomena, regards man as a natural ob-
ject, asserts man's innate goodness and potential to achieve self-realization
through reason, and views man as the sole and ultimate judge of his own
morality. 0 By many definitions, Secular Humanism is a religion,71 and
development").
67. See THIS WE BELIEVE (undated doctrinal statement of International Church of the Four-
square Gospel) (Bible is standard for daily living); SOUTHERN BAPTI.ST CONVENTION, THE BAPTIST
FAITH AND ME.SSAGE 7 (1963) (Bible is supreme standard for all human conduct); Letter from
Thomas McDill, President, Evangelical Free Church of America (Mar. 19, 1981) ("God has set forth
moral principles for man that reflect His Holiness"; these principles are "absolute," but "must be
applied with love, grace, and compassion"); Interview with Rabbi Gillman, Dean of Rabbinical
School, Jewish Theological Seminary (Mar. 1981) (classical Jewish thinking, illustrative of most Or-
thodox and many Conservative Jews, holds that Scripture, as interpreted by rabbinical tradition, is
source of absolute moral truth).
68. Many religious groups believe that, although made in the image of God, man fell and is thus
now sinful by nature. See SOUTHERN BAPTIST CONVENTION, BAPTIST FAITH AND MESSAGE (1963);
Interview with Director, Watchtower News Service (Mar. 1981) (Jehovah's Witnesses); Interview
with Dr. Albert Meyer, Director, Mennonite Board of Education (Mar. 1981).
69. "Humanism" refers to a number of movements and beliefs, both historical and contemporary.
See, e.g., J. HUXLEY, THE HUMANIST FRAME 13-48 (discussing type of psycho-social evolutionary
Humanism); A Humanist Manifesto I, 6 NEW HUMANIST (May-June 1933) (setting forth doctrine of
Religious Humanism). "Secular Humanism" likewise describes no single organized movement, but is
generally associated with tenets similar to, though not usually as comprehensive as, those summarized
in Humanist Manifesto II, 33 HUMANIST 4 (Sept.-Oct. 1973). See A SECULAR HUMANISTIC DECLA-
RATION 7-29 (P. Kurtz ed. 1980); Whitehead & Conlan, The Establishment of the Religion of Secular
Humanism and Its First Amendment Implications, 10 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1, 29-54 (1978); infra
note 70. To the extent that Humanism is presently an organized movement with a set of shared
beliefs, it tends to take the form, if not always the label, of Secular Humanism. See Whitehead &
Conlan, supra. At least two Humanistic educators have made the connection between Secular Hu-
manism and Humanistic Education explicit. See D. BRUBAKER & J. ZAHORIC, TOWARD MORE HU-
MANISTIC INSTRUCTION 4-9 (discussing eleven premises of Humanistic Education that roughly track
definition of Secular Humanism in Humanist Manifesto II, 33 HUMANIST 4-9 (Sept.-Oct. 1973)). On
the other hand, although Humanistic Educators often refer to Humanism, it is not always clear that
they mean Secular Humanism. See, e.g., O'Kane, The Fourth Face of Humanism, in HUMANISTIC
EDUCATION 331 (R. Weller ed. 1977) (discussing idea of defining Humanism as constricting; noting
religious aspects of some forms of Humanism).
70. The Humanist Manifesto II, 33 HUMANIST 4-9 (Sept.-Oct. 1973), contains 17 major state-
ments of belief, including assertions that God, religion, and the supernatural are at best irrelevant;
that specific religious beliefs, including belief in heaven or hell, or any form of life after death, the
existence of a separable human "soul," and the creation of man by a direct act of God, are dangerous
and represent obstacles to human progress; that moral values are wholly relative and situational; that
meaning is a function of happiness in "the here and now," that the scientific method and reason are
the best tools by which to achieve fulfillment as individuals and communities; that no form of sexual
conduct short of "unbridled promiscuity" is evil; and that individuals should have the right to abor-
tion, divorce, and birth control. The preface to the Manifesto asserts that "humanists still believe that
traditional theism, especially faith in the prayer-hearing God, assumed to love and care for persons, is
an unproved and outmoded faith," and that "salvationism. . .is harmful." Id. at 4. The Manifesto
concludes that Humanism is "a growing, living faith." See id. at 9. The proponents of Secular Hu-
manism do not unanimously subscribe to all the propositions asserted in Humanist Manifesto II. See,
e.g., 33 HUMANIST 7-10 (Nov.-Dec. 1973); 33 HUMANIST 4 (Sept.-Oct. 1973). In practice, the views
1209
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 91: 1196, 1982
the courts have in fact, at least for certain purposes, characterized it as a
religion.12
Because Humanistic Education fundamentally conflicts with certain re-
ligions and at least arguably promotes others, it will tend to affect private
religious choice and to engender political division along religious lines.
The threat to private choice is particularly serious in the public school
context because pre-college students may lack the capacity to reflect ma-
turely on the programs' messages7 or to resist peer pressure, 7  and be-
cause the schools themselves are inherently authoritarian. 75 The threat to
political neutrality is already emerging: religious groups have begun to
organize politically against Humanistic Education in the public schools.76
of Secular Humanists tend to coalesce around a somewhat narrower set of beliefs, such as the relativ-
ity of morals, the centrality and dignity of man, and the sufficiency of reason.
71. The system of beliefs set forth in Humanist Manifesto II, supra note 70, is easily character-
ized as religious. The Manifesto is the statement of an organized group supporting a system of beliefs
that addresses a comprehensive range of ultimate concerns, including specific views on life after death,
meaning, morality, man's role in the Universe, the existence of the supernatural, and the existence of
a separable soul in man. Cf infra p. 1215 (discussing factors courts generally employ in determining
whether a system of beliefs is religious); Whitehead & Conlan, supra note 69, at 54 (reaching conclu-
sion that Humanist Manifesto constitutes religious creed).
In its more common forms, Secular Humanism is not as dogmatic or comprehensive as the version
articulated in the Humanist Manifesto. See supra note 70. Nevertheless, many scholars consider the
movement as a whole to be religious. See, e.g., D. EHRENFELD, THE ARROGANCE OF HUMANISM 4
(1978).
72. See, e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (including Humanistic and nontheistic
beliefs as religions in construing meaning of religion for purposes of conscientious objection exemp-
tions to Selective Service statute); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.l1 (1961) ("Among reli-
gions in this country which do not teach what would generally be considered a belief in the existence
of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others."); Malnak v. Yogi,
592 F.2d 197, 200 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring) (arguing that establishment clause encom-
passes nontheistic religions such as Secular Humanism). Humanism is consistently accepted as a relig-
ion for purposes of the free exercise clause. See Washington Ethical Soc'y v. District of Columbia, 249
F.2d 127, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Fellowship of Humanity v. Alameda County, 153 Cal. App. 2d 673,
315 P.2d 394 (1957).
73. See R. GOLDMAN, RELIGIOUS THINKING FROM CHILDHOOD TO ADOLESCENCE 239 (1964);
K. HYDE, RELIGIOUS LEARNING IN ADOLESCENCE 104 (1965).
74. Cf Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 290-91 (1963) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (young children disinclined to step out of line or to flout "peer-group norms"); McCollum v.
Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (nonconformity not outstand-
ing characteristic of school children). Peer pressure plays a role in Values Clarification programs. See
Stewart, Problems and Contradictions of Values Clarification, in D. PURPEL & K. RYAN, supra note
46, at 13940 (peer pressure combines with Values Clarification strategies to coerce students to the
"mean").
75. See L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 825 (public schools carry authority of state and are inherently
inculcative); c. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 190-91 (1859) (government-run education "is a mere contri-
vance for moulding people to be exactly like one another and as the mould in which it casts them is
that which pleases the predominant power in the government, .. it establishes a despotism over the
mind").
76. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1980, § 4, at 17, col. 1 (evangelicals reacting with alarm to what
they believe is takeover of public schools by Secular Humanism). Publications in religious journals
reflect the intensity of this alarm. See, e.g., Hill, Parents Sleep While Humanism Destroys Souls of
Youth, VOICE OF FREEDOM June 1980, at 87 ("The ultimate objective of Humanism is to train the
consciences of our youth so that they recognize no need for God and Christ.. . ."); McMaster, Our
Public Schools, CHRISTIAN LIFE MAGAZINE, June 1980, at 32 (preface) ("Humanism is such a pleas-
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Despite this threat to the underlying values of the establishment clause,
most forms of Humanistic Education inhibit religion only indirectly77 and
promote beliefs that are only arguably religious." Because the establish-
ment clause forbids only programs with "primary" religious effects" and
may not reach programs that advance systems of belief that are only ar-
guably religious," these forms of Humanistic Education may fall outside
the scope of present doctrine. This gap between the establishment clause's
underlying values and the substantive reach of present doctrine requires a
reexamination of the relevance of "secondary" religious effects for estab-
lishment clause analysis.
III. Secondary Effects and the Establishment Clause
The Court's formal focus upon primary effects evolved, as a refinement
of the earlier strict separation standard, partly to reconcile the establish-
ment clause with certain forms of government support for religion. Be-
cause the current primary effects test has serious functional limitations,
however, the Court's next step should be to find a new and more worka-
ant-sounding word that it disarms most people. But unless this trend in education is rooted out of our
public schools, the future of our nation is imperiled.")
77. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 775-76 (1973) (indirect religious
effects not unconstitutional). Some Humanistic Education practices do have the primary effect of in-
hibiting religion. For example, some of the questions included in certain Values Clarification ques-
tionnaires are specifically slanted to cast doubt upon specific religious beliefs and institutions. See, e.g.,
S. SIMON, L. HOWE, & H. KIRSCHENBAUM, supra note 10, at 41, 43, 140 ("How many of you...
would choose to die and go to heaven if it meant playing a harp all day long? ...are getting
anything out of [Sunday school or religion class]?") To the extent that Values Clarification or other
Humanistic Education programs directly intrude into patently religious or spiritual areas, they will
have an unconstitutional primary effect. Cf Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48, 56 (S.D. Mich.
1965) (ordering that no projects be assigned on religious or irreligious topics such as "Why I believe
or disbelieve in religious devotions"); Moskowitz, The Making of the Moral Child: Legal Implia-
tions of Values Education, 6 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 105, 126 (1978) (specific substantive statements
about religion in Values Clarification materials make its presentation in public schools unconstitu-
tional under primary effect test).
There is also a new cluster of programs that purport to be Humanistic, but actually involve various
forms of spiritualism and eastern religion. Programs dealing in transpersonal psychology, for example,
actually involve spiritual psychology. See P. VITZ, supra note 52, at 13, 14; C. TART, TRANSPER-
SONAL PSYCHOLOGIES (1978). For a description of such programs, see Canfield & Klimek, Education
in the New Age, NEW AGE J., Feb. 1978, at 13 ("[S]tudents are asked to review their life in reverse
...until they come to the time before they were born. Here they meet a guardian spirit whom they
ask 'What is my life purpose?'. . . Many teachers have begun to work with mandalas ...
[A]dditional emphases in the transpersonal dimension are using nature as a teacher and aligning and
communicating with the other kingdoms such as the elemental and devic realms, . . . working with
children's psyche capacities such as seeing auras, working with astrological charts to provide students
with what each most needs.. . .") These programs' explicit involvement with eastern religions makes
them unconstitutional under the Court's current primary effect test. Cf Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d
197 (3d Cir. 1979) (striking down Transcendental Meditation program).
78. See supra notes 69-72.
79. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 775-76, 783 n.39 (1973) (indirect
effects have never been thought sufficient to invalidate government action).
80. See L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 827-31 (arguably nonreligious groups should be excluded
from definition of religion under establishment clause); Note, supra note 40, at 1085.
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ble approach involving scrutiny of secondary effects as well.
A. A Typology of Secondary Effects
The essence of all secondary religious effects" is that they accompany a
primary secular effect.12 The Supreme Court's explicit focus upon pri-
mary effects, however, has prevented it from considering other, less uni-
tary, characteristics of secondary effects. These distinguishing characteris-
tics can be used to identify four models of secondary religious effects,
which this Note denominates subordinate, ancillary, indirect, and diffuse.
The resulting typology reveals that present doctrine, under the guise of
both the primary effect test and the entanglement test, already reaches
some types of secondary effects, but fails to reach other, equally signifi-
cant, types. The typology further serves to suggest why such discrimina-
tion between different types of secondary effects frustrates the enforcement
of establishment clause values.
1. Subordinate Religious Effects
Government activity may have secondary religious effects if it has both
a direct secular impact and a direct, but less significant, religious impact.
Despite its directness, the religious message of a program may be so over-
shadowed by the greater prominence of a direct secular message that its
effect becomes relatively insubstantial. A typical public holiday pageant
occurring during the Christmas season and including a nativity scene ex-
emplifies such a subordinate secondary effect.8 3 Although such pageants
81. Secondary religious effects should be distinguished from incidental religious effects of the sort
that arise in free exercise cases. For example, a state law requiring a photograph on an individual's
driver license would not offend the establishment clause even though an individual could properly
claim a free exercise exemption from the law if it interfered with his or her beliefs. Bureau of Motor
Vehicles v. Pentecostal House of Prayer, Inc., 380 N.E.2d 1225 (Ind. 1978). In such cases, the reli-
gious "effect" arises not from the religiousness of the law, but from its incidental conflict with the
individual's belief system. See L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 831 (free exercise claims examined in terms
of role that beliefs assume in individual's life). Because such effects involve an individualistic evil, they
do not pose a serious threat to establishment clause values.
82. The Supreme Court has denied that its primary effect test calls for a distinction between
primary and secondary effects. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 n.39
("Our cases simply do not support the notion that a law found to have a 'primary' effect to promote
some legitimate end under the state's police power is immune from further examination to ascertain
whether it also has a direct and immediate effect of advancing religion.") The Court seems to be
arguing that the true import of the "primary" limitation is rather a distinction between substantial
and insubstantial religious effects. Although the Court's construction of the primary effect test signals
a move toward a stronger establishment clause standard, the Court has wholly ignored the need to
give some content in analytical terms to its distinction. This Note argues that the Court, in striking
down only some types of programs with secondary religious effects, has applied an idiosyncratic un-
derstanding of the meaning of "substantial" religious effect.
83. Such a pageant was upheld under the establishment clause in Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65
(D.C. Cir. 1973). The pageant, conceived as a tourist attraction, featured the National Christmas
Tree, a reindeer pen, a stage for the presentation of music and cultural events, a yule log fire, and a
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have a direct religious message, the religious effect is significantly subordi-
nated to a predominant secular message of entertainment and nonsectarian
celebration.84 Not all programs that have distinct secular and religious im-
plications will, however, have only a secondary religious effect: state-or-
ganized Bible reading and prayer in public schools, for example, have
both direct religious and direct secular effects.8 5 The relative importance
of the religious effects of such activities make them "primary" by any
reasonable standard.8 6
2. Ancillary Religious Effects
Wholly secular government programs whose implementation requires
close and continuous interaction with religious institutions have the poten-
tial, due to their obtrusive presence, to "chill" religious choice.87 For ex-
ample, loaning public school teachers to private religious schools to teach
nonideological subjects such as mathematics and history has, in theory, no
religious effect because it aids only the school's secular function." Yet, if
creche containing a nativity scene. Id. at 78-79 (Leventhal, J., concurring).
84. See id. at 72 (religion was not substantial aspect of challenged program). But see id. at 87-88
(Leventhal, J., concurring) (arguing that pageant had impermissible primary religious effect). The
Allen opinion is particularly significant because it followed the Supreme Court's decision in Commit-
tee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), which implicitly expanded the scope of the
primary effect test. See infra pp. 1217-18. The circuit court believed that even under the expanded
test, this type of effect was constitutional. See Note, A Workable Definition of the Establishment
Clause: Allen v. Morton Raises New Questions, 62 GEO. L.J. 1461 (1974).
85. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 210, 223-24 (1963). The secular pur-
poses proffered by the state were "the promotion of moral values, the contradiction to the materialistic
trends of our times, the perpetuation of our institutions, and the teaching of literature." Id.
86. Id.
87. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620 (1971) (discussing potential of continuous gov-
ernment contact to intrude on religion); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 255-56, 265-66 (1968)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (continuing surveillance of choices of textbooks made by private schools in
order to assure loan of only "secular" textbooks will tend to erode religious choice as well as provoke
political division).
88. The notion that government can constitutionally aid the secular function of a private religious
school was first explicitly developed in Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 247-48 (1968) (uphold-
ing loan of secular textbooks to religious school because Court could not, absent proof, assume that
such aid furthered anything but schools' secular function). The Allen doctrine was significantly modi-
fied by later cases that, in effect, shifted the burden of proof to the government to show that aid to a
religious school advanced only the schools' secular function. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349, 391-93 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that Court has unfairly shifted burden to
government to show that aid advances only secular function of school); Committee for Pub. Educ. v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 775-76 (1973) (discussing factors that affect whether aid is indisputably
marked off for support of school's secular function). The doctrine is still employed, however, to justify
certain types of nonideological aid to private religious schools, such as providing lunches, transporta-
tion, and public health facilities. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 364-65 (1975). But see Wol-
man v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 249-50 (1977) (nonideological aid may further religious mission of
religious school if school is pervasively sectarian).
The secular function doctrine suffers from the fact that aid that advances the secular function of a
religious school inevitably frees funds to advance the school's religious mission. This phenomenon can
best be understood as an indirect religious effect that exists in addition to the ancillary effect arising
from the monitoring required to ensure that aid primarily advances only a school's secular function.
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constant government surveillance is necessary to ensure that the public
school teachers do not succumb to institutional pressure to inculcate relig-
ion, the presence of the government accompanying the aid will tend to
stifle religious choice." Such aid, though wholly secular in nature, has an
ancillary secondary religious effect.
3. Indirect Religious Effects
Government programs may have a secondary religious effect if they
only indirectly inhibit or advance religion. Humanistic Education provides
a clear example of an indirect secondary religious effect."' Although Hu-
manistic Education is grounded upon a set of beliefs that clearly conflict
with the tenets of major religious faiths, most Humanistic Education pro-
grams do not explicitly teach these beliefs;9 the methodology and content
of the programs are derived from clear ideological premises, but students
are not directly exposed to those premises. Nevertheless, if the programs
succeed, many students will acquire a moral orientation that is inconsis-
tent with some religions and coincidental with others. That orientation
may, in turn, make some students more likely to accept, and others more
likely to reject, particular religious beliefs. To the extent that the pro-
grams influence religious beliefs, however, that effect is an indirect result
of the admittedly secular pursuit of encouraging students in their moral
development."
See infra p. 1214 (discussing indirect effects); d. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
775-76 (1973) (conceding that aid to secular function of religious school will indirectly advance reli-
gious function, but arguing that such indirect religious effects have never been thought
unconstitutional).
89. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 369-72 (1975) (invalidating loan of public school per-
sonnel to private religious school to perform speech and hearing tests and to engage in guidance
counseling because such aid required unconstitutional level of monitoring to assure that loaned per-
sonnel maintained strictly nonideological postures).
90. Another example is the advancement of the religious function of a private religious school
resulting from government aid to its wholly secular function. See supra note 88. Exclusive instruction
in the theory of evolution in public schools provides yet another example of the indirect religious
effect. The theory of evolution both indirectly inhibits some religions and indirectly advances others.
See Note, Freedom of Religion and Science Instruction in Public Schools, 87 YALE LJ. 515, 523-26
(1978) (teaching evolution in public schools undermines belief in many major religions).
91. But see supra note 77 (discussing some Humanistic Education programs that have primary
religious effect).
92. The premise of modern public education is that "secular education can be isolated from all
religious teaching." Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 218 (1963) (quoting Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1947) (Jackson, J., dissenting)). Yet moral development in some
form has been implicit in the structure of American education since the inception of the public school
system. Cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 593 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("In an age when the
home and church play a diminishing role in shaping the character and value judgments of the young,
a heavier responsibility falls upon the schools.") The courts appear to assume that the government has
a secular interest in the character and moral development of its people and, that, therefore, morality
can be secular. Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (education "is a principal
instrument in awakening the child to cultural values"). As a philosophical matter, the notion of a
secular morality is in dispute. See, e.g., B. MITCHELL, MORALITY: RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR (1980)
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4. Diffuse Religious Effects
Government activity may produce a secondary religious effect when its
message, although direct, has no clear religious component or is only ar-
guably religious. Just as the directness and prominence of a religious mes-
sage may determine whether its effect is secondary, the degree to which
the message is clearly religious will also bear on the substantiality of its
religious effect. Government activity whose religious meaning lurks within
an inseparable secular meaning will produce a more diffuse and therefore
less substantial religious effect than activity that is clearly religious, if only
because an arguably religious effect is also an arguably secular effect.
The form of Secular Humanism promoted by Humanistic Education
illustrates one kind of arguably religious program. Although definitions of
religion are problematic, courts and commentators have tended to label
systems of belief as "religious" in terms of one or more of three character-
istics: addressing ultimate concerns, espousing a comprehensive view of
life, and possessing certain external indicia, such as ritual, symbols, and
organizational structures.9" To the extent that a government program is
not identified with one or more of these characteristics,94 courts will find it
less obviously religious. Humanistic Education programs" do touch on
many ultimate concerns,96 but the programs do not promote their method
(discussing relationship between morality and religion and conflicting views on that relation-
ship).Whatever the philosophical merits of the notion, however, its acceptance appears to be necessary
in order to reconcile the public school system as presently conceived with the establishment clause.
See, e.g., Arons & Lawrence, supra note 13. At the same time, there obviously must be limits on what
the state can do in the name of morality. The somewhat amorphous notion of secular morality was
born out of this tension.
As a legal rather than a philosophical concept, however, secular morality may have more validity
than first appears. If the notion is explained in terms of private choice, it may be a useful way of
describing moral views as to which there is a social consensus. Certainly, the connection between
morality and religion will be more significant in the public school context when the moral views
presented diverge from the beliefs of the children or their parents. On the other hand, when moral
views converge, despite different underlying religious beliefs, it seems more credible to distinguish
between morality and religion. Of course, if the derivation of moral views is put at issue, the conflict is
unavoidable. This analysis leads to two conclusions about the nature of secular morality for constitu-
tional purposes. First, since consensus is less likely as the range of moral views discussed increases,
discussion of morality in public schools should be restricted to certain core moral issues. Second,
discussion of the source of morality should be avoided because it shifts the focus from an area of
consensus to the underlying religious conflict. Cf. infra at p. 1224 (applying these conclusions to
analysis of Humanistic Education).
93. See, e.g., Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F. 2d 197, 207-10 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring);
Note, supra note 40, at 1086-88.
94. The weight accorded to any one characteristic varies with the context. Normally, the absence
or presence of any one of the three characteristics by itself would not be dispositive of whether a
program is religious. See Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F. 2d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring).
95. See supra notes 48 & 49.
96. See supra pp. 1207-08. The basic issues of right and wrong, and the role of man in the
universe, are two of the three ultimate concerns mentioned by Judge Adams in his concurrence in
Manak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 209 (3d Cir. 1979). Judge Adams also argued that of the three
characteristics, the presence of ultimate concerns normally offers the most compelling evidence for
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for moral development as a substitute for, or to the exclusion of, religious
life or a relationship with God."' In addition, although the philosophical
movement of Secular Humanism does possess a limited institutional struc-
ture, the form of Secular Humanism promoted by Humanistic Education
programs is not easily identified with any organizational structure, ritual,
or symbolism." Secular Humanism is, on balance, arguably nonreligious,
and might be excluded by a narrow definition of religion; yet because
Humanistic Education programs attempt fundamentally to alter the moral
orientation of children, they thus are also at least arguably religious.99
B. The Relation Between Establishment Clause Tests and the Defini-
tion of Religion: Implications of the Typology of Secondary Effects
By suggesting that the extent to which a program is religious bears on
the substantiality of its religious effects, this Note departs from previous
establishment clause analysis. Prior analysis distinguishes between ques-
finding a system of belief religious. See id. at 208.
97. To the extent that Humanistic Education programs address the relevance of religious life,
belief in God, or other religious issues, they are clearly religious. See supra note 77 (discussing such
programs).
98. Secular Humanism is supported by the Fellowship of Religious Humanists and the Ethical
Culture movement. See C. CHAMBERS, THE SIECUS CIRCLE (1977). Some Secular Humanists also
participate in deliberative bodies that issue doctrinal statements. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1980, §
1, at 18, col. 1 (Secular Humanist group attacks fundamentalist Christian groups). The Humanist,
published by the American Humanist Association, functions as a clearinghouse for Humanist
dialogue.
Other surface signs of religion such as ritual are definitely lacking in Secular Humanism. Indeed,
the notion of ritual is objectionable to many Humanists. But see D. EHRENFELD, supra note 71, at 4
(Humanism has forms analogous to ritual).
99. Laws regarding abortion, homosexuality, and polygamy illustrate another kind of arguably
religious program. Each of these laws relates to a specific ultimate concern and is based on underlying
beliefs identifiable with specific organized religions. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1980, § 4, at 17,
col. 4 (evangelical Christians unite in opposition to abortion). The Supreme Court has denied that
such laws raise establishment clause or free exercise clause concerns. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448
U.S. 297 (1980), reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 917 (1980) (1980) (denying that funding restriction on abor-
tion payments under Medicaid raised any establishment clause issues); United States v. Reynolds, 98
U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding statutory prohibition of polygamy against free exercise clause challenge
with caveat that "laws are made for a government of actions and while they cannot interfere with
mere religious belief and opinions, they can with practices"). But see L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 838,
839 n.17 (if moral value underlying prohibition or requirement is closely linked to competing religious
tradition, then serious establishment clause issues raised).
All laws with a moral component could be considered arguably religious, but the attenuation in
most instances is so pronounced that attaching the label makes little sense. Laws against stealing, for
example, have a well-recognized instrumental as well as "ultimate" aim, and are not distinctly identi-
fied with particular sectarian traditions. The distinction between arguably religious enactments and
substantially secular laws is analogous to the distinction between a secular morality, see note 92
supra, and moral issues that inevitably implicate religious beliefs. Ultimately, both distinctions rest
upon the existence of some consensus among religious groups as to certain core or operating moral
values. Without a substantial element of consensus among religious groups on the basic moral struc-
ture of society, religious conflict in the political arena may be unavoidable. See generally Rushdoony,
The State as an Establishment of Religion, in FREEDOM AND EDUCATION: PIERCE V. SOCIETY OF
SISTERS RECONSIDERED (D. Kommers & M. Wahoske eds. 1980) (religious beliefs underlie positions
on abortion, homosexuality, and polygamy issues).
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tions relating to the definition of religion and arguments relating to the
actual criteria of unconstitutionality such as the effects test.100
The typology of secondary religious effects illustrates that treating the
definition of religion as a threshold issue is fundamentally mistaken. The
degree to which a program is clearly religious is merely one of several
factors that describe the relation between the secular and the religious
elements of a program and therefore determine the substantiality of a pro-
gram's religious effect. The degree to which a program is clearly religious
will affect the strength of its impact on private choice in the same sense
that the directness and prominence of a religious message will affect the
strength of its influence on private choice.
In practice, the distinction between the various types of secondary ef-
fects may blur. Though in a given case any one of the factors set out in
the Note's typology could determine the substantiality of an effect, none is,
as a principled matter, qualitatively more significant than the others. Cer-
tainly none is talismanic.
C. The Implicit Role of Secondary Effects in Present Doctrine
When the actual practice of courts in establishment clause cases is eval-
uated in light of the typology of secondary effects, it becomes readily ap-
parent that, despite present doctrine's formal emphasis on "primary" ef-
fects, the courts have in fact struck down government aid to religious
institutions that had secondary effects.' Even if the purpose and primary
100. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 826, 834; Boyan, Defining Religion in Operational and
Institutional Terms, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 479 (1968); Merel, supra note 30; Comment, Defining
Religion: Of God, the Constitution and the D.A.R., 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1965); Note, supra note
31. Some of the literature does recognize that manipulating the definition of religion affects the reach
of the three-prong test, or that expanding or contracting the test affects the meaningfulness of the
definition of religion under the establishment clause. See Merel, supra note 30, at 821-22 (tension
between free exercise clause and establishment clause can be reduced either by manipulating defini-
tion of religion or by constricting reach of substantive doctrine); Note, supra note 40, at 1084, 1088
n.144 (recognizing substantive effect of manipulating definition of religion). None of the literature has
suggested, however, that these two lines of establishment clause inquiry might be defined in terms of
each other.
101. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1971), for example, the Court invalidated,
among other things, a salary supplement paid to teachers in private religious schools who taught
wholly secular subjects. Because monitoring was necessary to ensure that "subsidized teachers do not
inculcate religion," the Court held that the program fostered an excessive entanglement between gov-
ernment and religion. Id. at 619. The Court conceded that the purpose of the plan-aiding the reli-
gious schools in their secular function of teaching nonideological subjects such as math and his-
tory-was secular and declined to decide whether the program had a primary effect that offended the
establishment clause.
Similarly, in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 367-72 (1975), the Court relied solely on the entan-
glement prong in invalidating a government program that supplied, among other things, guidance
counselors to religious schools. Refusing to find that such aid had an impermissible primary effect, the
Court concluded that the "potential for political entanglement together with the administrative entan-
glement which would be necessary to ensure that auxiliary-services personnel remain strictly neutral"
necessitated invalidation of the program. Id. at 372. The distinction drawn by the Court between
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effect of a program are secular, the Court will, under the entanglement
test, weigh the potential obtrusiveness of the government's interaction with
the religious institution against the secular justification for the program. 0 2
Similarly, in discussing the distinction between primary and secondary re-
ligious effects, the Court recently suggested that subordinate religious ef-
fects were unconstitutional.' 3 The Court stated that government programs
with direct religious effects were unconstitutional, regardless of whether
such effects were less substantial than the secular effects of the pro-
grams. 0 4 Significantly, many commentators consider the school-aid cases
to be unconvincing and doctrinally confusing."0 ' While the Court strikes
down programs involving some types of secondary effects, it has failed to
strike down programs entailing indirect religious effects or diffuse reli-
gious effects.10 6
IV. Toward aNew Doctrine of Secondary Effects
Though distinctions may be drawn between primary and secondary ef-
fects, they are not significant enough to justify ignoring the threat to es-
tablishment clause values posed by secondary effects. In predicating the
constitutionality of government programs upon such distinctions, current
doctrine gives them artificial significance and validity. Proscription of sec-
ondary effects in some contexts would respect those distinctions without
according them undue significance.
A. The Possibility of An Absolute Prohibition of Secondary Effects
The example of Humanistic Education demonstrates that secondary as
well as primary religious effects can threaten the underlying values pro-
tected by the establishment clause." 7 That the threat operates on an indi-
political and administrative entanglement suggests that what the Court calls administrative entangle-
ment actually comprehends infringement of the private choice value.
102. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 367-72 (1975); cf. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 795 (1973) (political divisiveness of program must be weighed against secular purposes).
103. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 n.39 (1973).
104. Id. ("Our cases simply do not support the notion that a law found to have a 'primary' effect
to promote some legitimate end under the State's police power is immune from further examination to
ascertain whether it also has the direct and immediate effect of advancing religion.")
105. See, e.g., Gaffney, Postscript: Meek, Wolman, And The "Fear of Imaginable But Totally
Implausible Evils" In The Funding Of Non-Public Education, in FREEDOM AND EDUCATION: PIERCE
V. SOCIETY OF SISTERS RECONSIDERED 79 (D. Kommens & M. Wahoske eds. 1980) (distinctions
drawn in school-aid cases make little sense as coherent constitutional doctrine and less sense as clear
guidelines for educators and policy-makers). The Court itself has divided on most of these cases. See,
e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
106. Cf L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 840 (in place of distinction between primary and secondary
effects, Court recently has substituted distinction between "direct and immediate" and "indirect and
incidental," thus expanding reach of effect test).
107. See supra pp. 1213-16.
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rect level does not eliminate it. Subtle persuasion of school children may
be more pernicious than outright indoctrination. 8 Similarly, a religious
effect does not lose its potential to compromise personal choice or foster
political discord merely because it is subordinate, ancillary, or diffuse.
Many commentators have argued that, even if the concept of secondary
religious effects has internal validity, an expanded establishment clause
standard would be unworkable or oppressive." 9 They contend that, since
secondary religious effects by definition accompany primary secular ef-
fects, prohibiting government programs with secondary religious effects
would necessarily frustrate legitimate secular interests. In some cases, for
example, prohibiting secondary effects would frustrate the government's
legitimate interest in aiding the secular function of private religious
schools."' Such a prohibition would also ultimately challenge the validity
of the public school system, whose very existence tends to inhibit religions
that believe that education cannot be divorced from religion."' If the idea
of a secondary effect includes the effects of arguably religious programs, a
prohibition of secondary effects would be far-ranging indeed, possibly
even invalidating social welfare programs." 2
The fear that a broad definition of religion under the establishment
clause would lead to such results has led numerous commentators to con-
clude that a narrower, more traditional, definition of religion is necessary
to prevent the clause from overreaching its purposes.' The same
problems do not afflict the free exercise clause, because it can accommo-
date such beliefs through exemptions;" 4 the establishment clause, because
it protects the social dimensions of private choice, cannot." 5 A thoroughgo-
108. See K. HYDE, supra note 73, at 98-104 (critical attitude during adolescence leads to rejection
of beliefs overtly urged upon students).
109. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 827-28; Merel, supra note 30, at 821; Note, supra note
40, at 1084. The fear of a broad establishment clause standard may be overstated. See Malnak v.
Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 212-13 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring) (comprehensiveness criterion in
definition of religion prevents establishment clause from becoming unworkable and from invalidating
legitimate secular programs such as social welfare activity).
110. See supra note 88 (discussing secondary religious effect of aid to secular function of religious
school).
111. See Merel, supra note 28, at 821; Little, Pierce and the Religion Clauses: Some Reflections,
in FREEDOM AND EDUCATION: PIERCE V. SOCIETY OF SISTERS RECONSIDERED 69, 72 (D. Kommers &
M. Wahoske eds. 1980); cf. Freund, Public Aid to Parochial Schools, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1680, 1685
(1969) (if public schools supported secular religion, First Amendment would require their abolition).
112. See L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 827-28; Note, supra note 40, at 1084. But see Malnak v.
Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 212-13 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring) (comprehensiveness component of
broad definition of religion would prevent this extreme result).
113. See L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 828-29 (establishment clause should exclude any arguably
nonreligious group); Note, supra note 40, at 1085 (arguing for dual definition); cf Malnak v. Yogi,
592 F.2d 197, 211 n.48 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring) (noting that substantial majority of
commentators favor dual definition of religion for free exercise and establishment clauses).
114. See supra note 30 (discussing exemptions under free exercise doctrine).
115. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 221, 224-25 (1963).
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ing prohibition of secondary effects would therefore be impractical. Al-
though current doctrine accords too much weight to the distinctions be-
tween primary and secondary effects, an absolute prohibition of secondary
effects would thus accord them too little weight.
B. A Balancing Test for Secondary Effects
Although an effective establishment clause standard must reach secon-
dary effects to fulfill the purposes of the constitutional guarantee, that
reach need not be absolute. Outside its core, the establishment clause
could be enforced through a balancing test similar to that used to enforce
other First Amendment guarantees.116
The development of a balancing approach under the free speech clause
is particularly instructive. Just as establishment clause decisions reveal a
reluctance to prohibit government action whose primary effect is secular
in order to alleviate a merely secondary burden on religion, some decisions
under the free speech clause have involved a refusal to remove incidental
burdens on speech resulting from government regulation of conduct."'
The courts in the latter group of cases feared that absolute protection of
conduct under the free speech clause would, like a prohibition of secon-
dary effects under the establishment clause, unduly restrict government
action.1 8 To avoid this prospect, some early free speech cases simply re-
fused to concede that certain conduct contained a speech element;1 9 the
courts eventually recognized, however, that protecting the speech element
116. Justice Brennan advocated the use of a least restrictive means test in his concurrence to
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 231 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that
establishment clause enjoins those involvements of religious with secular institutions that use religious
means to serve governmental ends where secular means would suffice). He reiterated this test in
concurrences to several later cases. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 680 (1970) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 643 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring). He
now seems satisfied, however, by the expansion of the scope of the primary effects test in Committee
for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 n.39 (1973) (declaring that government programs with
primary secular effects not immune from further scrutiny to see if such programs also have "substan-
tial" and "direct" religious effects). See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 373 n.l (1975) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (referring to Nyquisi formulation).
117. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 562-64 (1965) (distinguishing valid regulation of
conduct from invalid regulation of "pure" forms of expression); Giboney v. Empire, 336 U.S. 490,
498 (1949) (speech as integral part of conduct not protected by Constitution). Before the speech-
conduct distinction was fully articulated, however, the Court protected some forms of conduct under
the free speech clause. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940) (picketing protected
by First Amendment). Without pressing the analogy too far, cases like Thornhill can be usefully
compared to early establishment clause cases, which also claimed to rely upon a broad and absolute
standard. See supra pp. 1197-99 (discussing separation standard).
118. See L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 601 (early free speech decisions unwilling to concede that
free speech clause had any relevance to political assassinations, bank robberies, or other violent modes
of expression).
119. See Kalven, Upon Rereading Mr. Justice Black On The First Amendment, 14 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 428, 449-50 (1967) (Justice Black's absolutist view of free speech clause forced him to articulate
distinction between speech and conduct so as to avoid rendering clause unworkable).
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in conduct did not always represent a serious threat to governmental
interests. 121
Current free speech doctrine protects the speech element in conduct
without unduly restricting government by balancing the governmental in-
terest in regulating the conduct against the incidental burden on speech. 12t
Government regulation of conduct is invalid under that balancing ap-
proach unless it furthers a substantial or compelling interest.12 2 Moreover,
even if the governmental interest is substantial, the current test will per-
mit an incidental burden on speech only to the extent necessary to further
the government's substantial interest.2 3 The government must, therefore,
tailor its means to fit its interest in a way that affirmatively avoids bur-
dening free speech. 2
4
The free exercise clause also employs a balancing test to reconcile legiti-
mate government interests with the protection of religious liberty.12 1
Under the free exercise clause, once a claimant demonstrates infringement
of a religious interest, the burden shifts to the state to prove that the pro-
gram is justified by a compelling interest. 26 If the government meets this
burden, it must then also prove that the challenged program was the least
burdensome means of fulfilling that interest.2 7
Applied to establishment clause problems, the balancing test would al-
low a government program that has the secondary effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion to stand only if the government could demonstrate that
its program was the least burdensome means of achieving a secular goal
whose value was compelling, relative to the degree of infringement of reli-
gious freedom. The test would thus require the government to articulate
its secular interest and to justify the fit between its chosen means and its
interest, but would let the government pursue a program that could not
avoid affecting religion if the primary secular effect of the program were
sufficiently important. By making explicit the weighing process that now
proceeds, if at all, under the guise of applying an absolute standard, the
120. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (recognizing that
protected speech may take different and even "ingenious" forms).
121. See O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
122. Id. at 376. Government can, however, regulate expressive conduct subject to only minimal
scrutiny if it falls within one of four narrowly drawn categories: speech or expressive conduct that is
directed to incite immediate violence and is likely to incite such action, that is defamatory, that invades
privacy, or that is obscene.
123. See O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
124. For example, if a law is not narrow enough to reflect a close fit between the state's means
and its interests, the Court may not recognize the legitimacy of the state's interest. See, e.g., Street v.
New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (statute applied to proscribe "fighting words" invalidated be-
cause not narrowly drawn to punish only such words).
125. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (interest of state must be balanced against
free exercise right at issue).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 407.
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test would also help to ensure that establishment clause cases were decided
consistently. ' The application of the test to one set of facts would provide
a standard against which to compare future balancing questions.
An explicit weighing process is preferable to the assumption implicit in
current doctrine that the benefits of proscribing certain types of secondary
effects are never significant when compared to the sacrifice of governmen-
tal interests that such 1 proscription would entail. This assumption would
be justifiable only if the government's interest in the primary secular ef-
fects of its programs were always substantial relative to the secondary reli-
gious effects of those programs, and the value of alleviating secondary reli-
gious infringement were never worth the cost of forcing government to use
a less burdensome alternative to accomplish its interest.
The balancing test would supplant such speculation with a more sensi-
tive approach. The test would, for example, largely eliminate the need for
an artificially narrow definition of religion under the establishment clause
by simply requiring that government not use an arguably religious means
to a secular end if a secular means would suffice. 2 9 Similarly, the test
would often prevent other types of secondary religious effects by requiring
that government not use a means with an indirect, subordinate, or ancil-
lary impact on religion, if a means without such effects could fulfill the
government's interest. By qualifying in a principled way the expansive-
ness of the secondary effects proscription, the test would obviate the type
of discrimination among secondary effects in which the Court has engaged
in recent cases.
C. The Balancing Test Applied to Humanistic Education
Most forms of Humanistic Education have the primary secular effect of
inculcating morality.1" 0 Because Humanistic Education also has secondary
religious effects, its constitutionality will depend on whether the govern-
ment's interest in inculcating morality in public schools is compelling
when weighed against the programs' secondary religious infringement,
and on whether there are less burdensome means of inculcating morality.
128. The balancing approach would also make explicit the reality that religious freedom is some-
times sacrificed to compelling governmental ends. Current doctrine sidesteps this problem by defining
the asserted freedom away. But, when religious freedom is at stake, hiding substantive moves in defi-
nitional gambits is a dangerous practice, cf United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 92 (1944) (Jack-
son, J., dissenting), especially since the distinction between secondary and primary religious effects is
largely a question of judgment rather than a difference in kind. The balancing approach not only
shows greater respect for religious freedom in a substantive sense, but raises the court's awareness of
it even when a compelling secular interest requires its subordination.
129. Because the test permits government activity with a compelling interest, adding arguably
religious groups to the list of establishment clause religions would not make the clause unworkable.
130. See supra note 77 (discussing forms of Humanistic Education with primary religious effects);
supra note 92 (discussing notion of secular morality).
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1. Weighing Humanistic Education's Interest Against Its Religious
Effects
Humanistic Education's secondary religious effects, promoting Secular
Humanism and inhibiting traditional religions, are serious. But instruc-
tion in morality will inevitably tend to conflict and to coincide with vari-
ous religious beliefs to some extent, no matter how apparently nonreli-
gious the instruction may be.' It is arguable that such instruction thus
necessarily results in secondary religious infringement. Yet the view that
morality can be secular has, if not complete theoretical support, wide ap-
peal" 2 and some basis in precedent.'
Moreover, it seems clear that government has a compelling interest in
the character of its citizens. Indeed, it would be difficult to deny the legiti-
macy of this interest in light of the traditions of various forms of moral
instruction in public schools.? 4 In sum, it appears that the government's
compelling interest in preserving some form of moral instruction in public
schools outweighs the burden of secondary religious infringement.
2. Means Analysis
Although the ends of Humanistic Education would not violate a balanc-
ing test under the establishment clause, the nature of Humanistic Educa-
tion's threat to establishment clause values suggests that there are other,
significantly less burdensome, means of inculcating morality. Humanistic
Education's influence on private choice stems essentially from its moral
relativism, methodological bias, and comprehensiveness. These factors
combine to propel Humanistic Education beyond the pale of "secular"
morality and into religious areas. By sharpening the religious profile of
Humanistic Education, these factors also give Humanistic Education high
political visibility.
Morality could be inculcated in a significantly less burdensome fashion.
Instruction in morality, for public school purposes, does not need to ex-
plore the full range of moral issues. Nor does it need to pose the issues in
a way that biases students against consulting external referents of truth."'
131. See D. PURPEL & K. RYAN, supra note 46, at 9 (transmission of moral values in public
schools is unavoidable, whether purposive or not); Arons & Lawrence, supra note 13, at 97 (legal
fiction that schooling can be morally neutral).
132. See Moskowitz, supra note 77, at 113-14 (most state legislatures have enacted statutes re-
quiring public schools to inculcate morality).
133. See supra note 92 (discussing notion of secular morality).
134. See Stephens v. Bongart, 15 N.J. Mis. 80, 92, 189 A. 131, 137 (1937) ("[I]nstilling of
worthy habits, attitudes, appreciations and skills is far more important than the mere imparting of
subject-matter."); Moskowitz, supra note 77, at 107-14 (discussing history of moral instruction in
public schools).
135. See Lockwood, supra note 55, at 168 (it is not necessary to embrace ethical relativism in
avoiding pitfalls of authoritarianism).
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Finally, instruction in morality would engender less conflict with religious
groups if it avoided controversial techniques such as group therapy or sen-
sitivity training. Not only do these techniques rest upon specific theories of
man's nature and the nature of morality, but they focus on the process of
deriving moral values, and thus invite religious conflict.
If moral instruction were so limited and modified, the need to avoid
presenting absolute values would be reduced. While, for example, beliefs
about abortion vary greatly, there is a consensus of belief that stealing is
wrong. Moreover, less attention would be directed to the source of belief if
there were no dispute about the beliefs themselves. If necessary, however,
instruction in morality could avoid presenting absolute or authoritarian
models without biasing students against consulting them. Thus, restricting
the scope of Humanistic Education and reducing its relativism would mit-
igate its conflict with religious interests without compromising the govern-
ment's compelling interest in morality instruction in public schools.
Adopting the less burdensome approach would also enhance political neu-
trality by reducing sources of political conflict over religious issues.
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